Advisory Opinion of the RI Supreme Court Relating to the Constitutional Convention, Part 4 (pp. 245-317) by unknown
HELIN Consortium
HELIN Digital Commons
Library Archive HELIN State Law Library
1935
Advisory Opinion of the RI Supreme Court
Relating to the Constitutional Convention, Part 4
(pp. 245-317)
Follow this and additional works at: http://helindigitalcommons.org/lawarchive
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the HELIN State Law Library at HELIN Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Library Archive by an authorized administrator of HELIN Digital Commons. For more information, please contact anne@helininc.org.
Recommended Citation
"Advisory Opinion of the RI Supreme Court Relating to the Constitutional Convention, Part 4 (pp. 245-317)" (1935). Library Archive.
Paper 83.
http://helindigitalcommons.org/lawarchive/83
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
SUPREME COURT OCTOBER TERM, A . D . 1 9 3 4 
In re OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR 
Re CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
BRIEF SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL AS AMICI CURIAE 
BY LEAVE OF COURT IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF RHODE 
ISLAND TO CALL A CONVENTION TO REVISE OR 
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
Argued February 18, 1935 
HERBERT M . SHERWOOD, ESQ. 
RICHARD S . ALDRICH 
H E N R Y M . BOSS, J * . 
WESTCOTE H . CHESEBROUGH 
SIDNEY CLIFFORD 
JAMES C . COLLINS 
HARRY PARSONS CROSS 
WALTER CURRY 
EDWARD L . GODFREY 
WILLIAM B . GREENOUGH 
WILLIAM R . HARVEY 
JAMES A . HIGGINS 
LOUIS V . JACKVONY 
FRANCIS B . K E E N E Y 
E D M U N D J . K E L L Y 
CLIFFORD A . KINGSLEY 
JAMES B . LITTLEFIELD 
EDWARD F . LOVEJOY 
RICHARD E . L Y M A N 
ARCHIBALD C . MATTESON 
B E N J A M I N M . M C L Y M A N 
E . BUTLER M O U L T O N 
WILLIAM A . P E C K H A M 
FRED B . PERKINS 
WILLIAM P . SHEFFIELD 
CHARLES P . SISSON 
HAROLD E . STAPLES 
R U S H STURGES 
WALTER I . S U N D L U N 
HAROLD B . T A N N E R 
FRANK W . TILLINGHAST 
EVERETT L . WALLING 
CLARENCE N . WOOLLEY 
Amici Curiae 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S U P R E M E COURT OCTOBER TERM, A . D . 1 9 3 4 
In re Opinion to the Governor 
Re Constitutional Convention 
BRIEF SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL AS AMICI CURIAE 
BY LEAVE OF COURT IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF RHODE 
ISLAND TO CALL A CONVENTION TO REVISE OR 
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
On January 24, 1935, under the authority of Article 10, 
Section 3, of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island, 
the Governor of the State of Rhode Island requested the 
judges of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to give their 
written opinion upon the following questions: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power 
if the General Assembly should provide by law 
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the State; 
" (b ) that the Governor shall call for the election, at 
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such conven-
tion in such number and manner as the General Assem-
bly may determine; 
" ( c ) that the General Officers of the State shall by 
virtue of their offices be members of such convention; 
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such con-
vention ; 
" (e ) for the submission to the people, for their rati-
fication and adoption, of any constitution or amend-
ments proposed by such convention; and 
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" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote of 
a majority of the electors voting upon the question of 
such ratification and adoption?" 
This brief is submitted by leave of Court by the under-
signed amid curiae in opposition to the legislative power and 
authority of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Is-
land to call a convention to revise or amend the Constitution 
of the State. 
Counsel regret the undue length of this brief and any ap-
parent lack of coordination in presenting their argument. 
Any such defects in form are due to the desire of counsel to 
use the time available for preparation in presenting to the 
court substantive material rather than in developing a for-
mally finished brief. 
HISTORY OF THE QUESTION 
Abraham Lincoln is credited with saying that government 
in the United States is "of the People, by the People, and for 
the People." Lincoln's phrase epitomizes our theory of gov-
ernment, whereby we hold that the sovereign powers of gov-
ernment are in the People; that in the exercise of those pow-
ers they may organize and establish whatever form of gov-
ernment they desire; and that once a government is estab-
lished, it should exercise its powers for the benefit of the 
People. 
Of course, it is obvious that no matter how thoroughly we 
may believe that the powers of government are in the People, 
the People must necessarily delegate certain of those powers 
to the government which they a t any particular time estab-
lish. History records that in the evolution of government 
in a variety of civilizations many forms of government have 
been developed, not the least of which is constitutional gov-
ernment. In 12 Corpus Jur is at p. 12 we read: 
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"A constitution may be defined as that fundamental 
law of a state which contains the principles on which 
government is founded, regulates the division of sov-
ereign powers, and directs to what persons each of 
these powers is to be intrusted and the manner of its 
exercise." 
The same authority points out that there may be written 
or unwritten constitutions. The latter is the result of grad-
ual growth, changing by accretions rather than by any sys-
tematic method. Such were the constitutions of Athens and 
Rome, and such is the constitution of England today. In 
Freeman's Growth of English Constitution at p. 122 the au-
thor says: 
"The code of our unwritten constitution has, like 
all other English things, grown up bit by bit, and for 
the most part silently and without any acknowledged 
author." 
On the other hand, written constitutions are those which 
exist in definite written form and are promulgated at a par-
ticular time. They are usually prepared by a specially con-
stituted authority which is generally known in the United 
States as a constitutional convention, made up of delegates 
thereto elected by the people. 
Text writers agree that a constitutional convention is pe-
culiarly an American institution. I t arose from the necessity 
for organized governments to replace the charter govern-
ments which were terminated by the Declaration of Inde-
pendence in all the colonies except Rhode Island and Con-
necticut. In organizing such new governments the conven-
tions acted in the most practical manner demanded by local 
conditions. They were irregular in organization, indefinite 
as to functions, and in all cases except one the constitutions 
drafted were promulgated by the conventions without sub-
mission to the people. See Jameson Const. Conv. (4th ed.) 
Sec. 131-158. 
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In Rhode Island, however, no such convention was held. 
Instead we find that on May 4, 1776 the General Assembly 
repealed an act of allegiance to Great Britain and the gov-
ernment continued under the charter of 1663. Thereafter on 
July 18, 1776 the General Assembly approved the Declara-
tion of Independence, and changed the name of the colony 
to "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations." The 
people did not dispute this action of the General Assembly 
but clearly acquiesced in a government under the provisions 
of the Royal Charter of 1663. Thus did sovereignty pass 
from the English Crown to the People. The explanation usu-
ally given is that the provisions of the charter were particu-
larly liberal in the matters of self-government, thus making 
it unnecessary to restate established principles of government 
in order to perpetuate the political and civil rights of the 
people. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a new govern-
ment actually came into existence with sovereignty in the 
People. 
Subsequent to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, 
agitation arose for the draft ing of a constitution for Rhode 
Island. This agitation was due partly to the fact that under 
the charter suffrage was limited to landholders and part ly 
to the fact that the centers of population were dissatisfied 
with their representation in the General Assembly. This agi-
tation continued for half a century and finally culminated in 
the adoption of a constitution framed by a constitutional con-
vention in 1842. For a more detailed account of this move-
ment see Appendix A. 
Since the charter contained no provision for amendment 
and since the adoption of a new constitution involved the in-
stitution of a new government, it was generally conceded 
that a constitutional convention was a proper method of pro-
cedure. Thus in June, 1842 the General Assembly passed an 
act whereby the People of the several towns and of the City 
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of Providence, "qualified to vote as hereinafter provided, are 
hereby requested * * * to choose delegates as they will be 
severally entitled to according to the provisions of this act, 
to attend a Convention * * * to frame a new Constitution 
for this State, either in whole or in part, with full powers 
for that purpose." The act is otherwise similar to those of 
1824, 1834 and 1841, with additional provisions for the exten-
sion of the suffrage. A convention organized pursuant to this 
act and framed a constitution, which was submitted to and 
adopted by the people in November, 1842, the government 
thereunder going into effect in May, 1843. However, it is 
significant to note that under Article X I I I of the new con-
stitution amendments were to be proposed by the legislature 
and then submitted to the people. The method of amend-
ment by a constitutional convention was ignored as was 
every other possible method of amendment. Article X I I I 
reads as follows: 
" O F AMENDMENTS 
The general assembly may propose amendments to 
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the 
members elected to each house. Such propositions for 
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and 
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of 
state, with the names of all the members who shall have 
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town 
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions 
shall be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or 
notices by them issued, for warning the next annual 
town and ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall 
read said propositions to the electors when thus as-
sembled, with the names of all the representatives and 
senators who shall have voted thereon, with the yeas 
and nays, before the election of senators and repre-
sentatives shall be had. If a majority of all the mem-
bers elected to each house, at said annual meeting, shall 
approve any proposition thus made, the same shall be 
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published and submitted to the electors in the mode 
provided in the act of approval; and if then approved 
by three-fifths of the electors of the state present and 
voting thereon in town and ward meetings, it shall be-
come a part of the constitution of the state." 
From a perusal of Appendix A it will be noted that in 1821 
and 1822 the General Assembly submitted the question 
whether it was expedient to provide for the election of dele-
gates to a convention. In 1824, 1834, 1841 and 1842 the 
General Assembly requested the election of delegates to a 
convention and provided for the organization of the conven-
tion. At the May Session, 1853 the proponents of a con-
stitutional convention secured the passage of an act, where-
by "The people of this State are hereby invited and requested 
to give in their ballots * * * in relation to the Convention 
hereinafter provided for". Those in favor of a convention 
were requested to write "Convention," and those who were 
opposed, "No Convention." The act then provides that "the 
people are further invited and requested, at the time and 
place aforesaid, to elect delegates * * * to meet in Convention 
• * * for the purpose of forming a Constitution of govern-
ment for this State". In October, 1853 a similar act was 
passed and the proposition was again rejected by the people 
in November, 1853. 
From the above it is clear that af ter the adoption of the 
constitution of 1842 the proponents of a constitutional con-
vention believed that under the constitution the people 
must first express a desire for a convention before one could 
be called. Hence the electors were requested to vote on that 
proposition before proceeding to elect delegates. Moreover 
just as before the constitution, the people were not "re-
quired" to hold a convention; the legislature merely "in-
vited and requested" the election of delegates to such con-
vention. In other words neither before nor after 1842 did 
the general assembly attempt to legislate with respect to a 
constitutional convention. 
I t will also be noted that the acts of 1853 provided for a 
new constitution and not for the amendment of the one then 
existing. Apparently it was conceded that amendment was 
possible only in the manner prescribed by Article XII I . 
This view is confirmed by the fact that in 1881 a bill was in-
troduced into the general assembly to amend Article XIII , 
so that the assembly would have the authority to call con-
stitutional conventions to revise, alter or amend the consti-
tution. I t was submitted to the electors in 1882 but was 
rejected. 
The proponents of the convention method then sought to 
determine whether a convention to frame a new constitution 
could be called by the legislature. In 1883 the state senate 
passed a resolution requesting the judges of the Supreme 
Court to give their opinion on (1) the legal competency of 
the general assembly to call upon the electors to elect mem-
bers to a constitutional convention to frame a new constitu-
tion and (2) the legal competency of the general assembly 
to submit to the electors the question whether the electors 
would call such convention, and if the majority were willing, 
whether the general assembly was legally competent to pro-
vide by law for the holding of such convention and for the 
submission of the new constitution to the electors. I t should 
be noted that no question was raised as to the procedure to 
be followed in amending the constitution. In a celebrated 
opinion rendered March 30. 1883 the judges unanimously 
answered the questions in the negative. 
The opinion of 1883 gave rise to a thorough discussion of 
the legal questions involved by the foremost lawyers of 
Rhode Island, led on the one hand by Chief Justice Thomas 
Durfee and on the other hand by ex-Chief Justice Charles 
S. Bradley. From that time until the present day the issues 
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involved have been the subject of political agitation, despite 
the fact that the constitution of 1842 has been amended four-
teen times in the manner prescribed by the constitution and 
without the use of a constitutional convention. 
STATEMENT OF POSITION 
In arguing that the court should answer in the negative 
the question submitted by the governor, the position of the 
undersigned may be stated as follows: 
As set forth in the Declaration of Independence, it is self-
evident that all men are endowed with certain unalienable 
rights and 
"That to secure these rights governments are insti-
tuted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed; that whenever any form of 
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to insti-
tute a new government * * * ." 
Also everyone will subscribe to the statement of George 
Washington incorporated into Section 1 of Article I of our 
State Constitution that 
"the basis of our political systems is the right of the 
people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment; but that the constitution which at any time ex-
ists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of 
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all." 
However, it is our contention that the right thus declared 
both by the Declaration of Independence and by the State 
Constitution is not a right derived from the government 
established by the constitution, but a right which exists inde-
pendent of the constitution. In other words, it is a right 
of the people to make changes in their government without 
the authority of the government. In short, i t is nothing 
more or less than the right of revolution as set forth in the 
Declaration of Independence. This right of revolution may 
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be exercised peacefully or by force of arms. A constitutional 
convention is an example of the former, while the American 
Revolutionary War is an example of the latter. In neither 
case, however, is the alteration or change in government 
brought about by the authority of the existing government, 
which can neither consent thereto nor acquiesce therein. As 
George Washington once said: 
"The very idea of the power and the right of the 
people to establish government presupposes the duty of 
every individual to obey the established government." 
Hence, the governor's inquiry should be answered in the 
negative. 
The governor, legislature and courts of this state are 
sworn to uphold the constitution of the State of Rhode Is-
land; that is, they are sworn to uphold the existing govern-
ment. Accordingly, they violate their oath of office when-
ever they initiate, promote or participate in any act of the 
people not authorized by the existing constitution of govern-
ment which is intended to alter that constitution of govern-
ment. Their sworn obligation demands support of the exist-
ing government and the refusal to participate in any move-
ment that is revolutionary. The matter is expressed in 
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions at pp. 233-6 as fol-
lows: 
"The right of revolution stands not upon the letter 
of any law, but upon the necessity of self preservation, 
and is just as perfect in the single man or in the petty 
state as in the most numerous and powerful empire in 
the world. This right, the founders of our system 
were careful to preserve not as a right under, but, when 
necessity demands its exercise, over our constitutions 
state and Federal. . . . The second class of documents 
consists in the bill of rights of a large number of our 
constitutions, containing broad general assertions of 
the right of the people to alter or abolish their form of 
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government, at any time, and in such a manner as they 
may deem expedient. The peculiarity of these docu-
ments is, that they seem to assert the right in question 
as a legal right; at least, they furnish a plausible argu-
ment for those who are willing to have it believed that 
the right is a legal one; when in fact it is a revolu-
tionary right. The framers of those constitutions gen-
erally inserted in them provisions for their own amend-
ment. Had nothing further been said, it might have 
been inferred that no other mode of securing needed 
changes was under any circumstances to be pursued, 
but that prescribed in those instruments. Such how-
ever was not the intention of the framers. They 
meant to leave to the people, besides, the great right 
of revolution, formally and solemnly asserted in the 
Declaration of Independence. They therefore affirmed 
it to be a right of the people to alter or abolish their 
constitutions in any manner whatever, that is, first, 
legally, in the mode pointed out in their constitutions, 
or by the customary law of the land, and secondly, 
illegally, that is, for sufficient causes, by revolutionary 
force." [Italics partially ours] 
So far as the use of a constitutional convention to revise 
or amend our state constitution is concerned, the question 
before this court is whether such means of altering the con-
stitution is authorized by the constitution. Our position is, 
as stated by Jameson, above, that the method of amending 
the constitution prescribed by Article X I I I is exclusive of 
every other method to revise or amend the same constitu-
tionally. Any other method is revolutionary. In other 
words, the mere fact that under Section 1 of Article I the 
framers of our constitution recognized the revolutionary 
right of the people to make and alter their constitutions is 
not a delegation of the power to do so under the authority of 
the constitution itself. 
I t should be noted further that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence states that the powers of government are derived 
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"from the consent of the governed." In other words, when 
the people establish a government they consent to be gov-
erned by the provisions of its constitution, and as declared 
by Section I of Article I of our constitution, "the constitution 
which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and 
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon 
all." In other words, by adopting the existing constitution 
and by incorporating therein a specific provision for Its 
amendment, the people have consented to be bound by such 
provisions as long as such constitution continues to exist as 
a constitution of government. In this connection see Cooley, 
Const. Limitations (7th) p. 56, where the author says: 
"The theory of our political system is that the ulti-
mate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs 
all legitimate authority. The people of the Union 
created a national constitution, and conferred upon it 
powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and the 
people of each State created a State government, to ex-
ercise the remaining powers of sovereignty so far as 
they were disposed to allow them to be exercised at all. 
By the constitution which they establish, they not only 
tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their oven 
hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor 
the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to 
take action in opposition to this fundamental law." 
[Italics ours] 
I t is submitted, therefore, that the fundamental question 
before the court is whether a constitutional convention may 
be employed as a means of revising or amending the consti-
tution under authority contained in the constitution itself. 
If such convention is not so authorized, it is obvious that no 
member of the existing government can constitutionally 
have any par t whatsoever in the calling, organization or de-
liberations of such a convention. In fact, it is their sworn 
duty to oppose it. Thus Cooley says at p. 892: 
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"Although by their constitutions the people have dele-
gated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several 
departments, they have not thereby divested themselves 
of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, 
so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power 
to control the governments they create, and the three 
departments are responsible to and subject to be or-
dered, directed, changed, or abolished by them. But 
this control and direction must be exercised in the 
legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of 
the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be 
of legal force only when expressed at the times and un-
der the conditions which they themselves have pre-
scribed and pointed out by the constitution, or which, 
consistently with the constitution, have been prescribed 
and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any por-
tion of the people, however large, an attempt should be 
made to interfere with the regular working of the 
agencies of government at any other time or in any 
other mode than as allowed by existing law, either con-
stitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in 
character, and must be resisted and repressed by the 
officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate 
government[Italics ours] 
We believe that constitutional history both within and 
without Rhode Island fully supports our major contention. 
Furthermore, the same support is found in the opinions and 
judicial utterances of the courts. However, we would point 
out to the court that the constitutions of only seven states 
provide for advisory opinions by the court to the legislative 
and executive departments of government, so that it is diffi-
cult to find instances where the constitutionality of a consti-
tutional convention has been raised prior to the calling of 
the convention. 
The general situation revealed by the authorities is that 
constitutional conventions have been called and held and 
that a new constitution has been drafted and promulgated 
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or adopted before the question has been brought before a 
proper judicial tribunal. Accordingly, by the time the court 
has been called upon to act in the matter or express an 
opinion, the changes in government brought about by the 
new constitution of government are an accomplished polit-
ical fact, and the court expressing an opinion is existing un-
der the new or amended government and sworn to uphold it 
or is in some other manner compelled to accept the political 
situation as it then exists. A classic example of a peaceful 
revolution is the transition of our national government from 
that under the Articles of Confederation to that under our 
Federal Constitution. In this connection see Luther vs. Bor-
den, 7 How. (U. S.) 1. 
We believe, however, that it can definitely be said with-
out contradiction that there exists no judicial decision to the 
effect that a constitutional convention can be called by a con-
stitutional legislature, unless the constitution of the partic-
ular state involved specifically provides for that method of 
amendment. The expression of any court to the contrary is 
purely dictum. On the other hand, in addition to the opinion 
of the judges contained in 14 R. I. 649 we would refer the 
court to the case of 
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 553. 116 X. E. 921 (1917), 
which is a judicial decision to the effect that the general leg-
islative power conferred upon the General Assembly by the 
Indiana Constitution does not authorize the General Assem-
bly to call a constitutional convention without first securing 
authority from the people. This case arose upon a bill for an 
injunction against certain state officials prohibiting them 
from doing any act as required by an act of the legislature 
calling a constitutional convention for the purpose of revis-
ing the constitution. I t will be observed, therefore, that the 
question came before the court before any action had been 
taken pursuant to the act of the legislature and the court, 
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acting under the existing constitution, had no alternative 
than to grant the injunction. 
I t should also be noted that in connection with our con-
stitutional history, the original constitutional conventions 
were irregularly called and held because of the necessities of 
the situation incident to the Declaration of Independence. 
The only practical method open to the people for setting up 
a new government was through some kind of representative 
assembly. They had long been accustomed to representative 
government and were not shocked by having a representative 
assembly meet and create new constitutions of government. 
I t is not surprising, however, that in creating new constitu-
tions, provisions were incorporated in some of them and 
finally in all for their future amendment, since it was obvi-
ous that some means other than revolution should be pro-
vided whenever a change should be desired. 
But it should be remembered that by incorporating a par-
ticular method of amendment in their constitutions, the peo-
ple tied their hands with respect to employing constitution-
ally any other method of amendment. Thus by adopting the 
method prescribed by Article X I I I the people of Rhode Is-
land chose to ignore all methods, including a constitutional 
convention, and agreed to be bound by the method pre-
scribed. In this connection the views of Thomas W. Dorr, 
Rhode Island's foremost champion of a convention, are en-
lightening. In Burke's Report at p. 863 he is reported as 
saying: 
"Where there is a mode of amendment prescribed by 
the constitution of a State, it ought to be followed." 
However, the argument is sometimes made that despite 
the provisions of Article XI I I , the legislature is given the 
power to call a constitutional convention, because it was one 
of the powers exercised by the General Assembly under the 
charter government and was delegated to our present gen-
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eral assembly under the provisions of Sec. 10 of Article IV 
of the constitution, which reads as follows: 
"Sec. 10. The general assembly shall continue to ex-
ercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless 
prohibited in this constitution." 
The short answer to such argument is that by providing a 
specific method of amending the constitution under Article 
XI I I , the framers of our constitution prohibited the use of 
any other method under any general delegation of power 
contained in Sec. 10 of Article IV. In this connection see 
Taylor d- Co. vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. 
Of course, i t may be argued that even if the right of the 
People to hold a constitutional convention is extra-constitu-
tional, the legislature has the power as a representative of 
the people to call such convention. The answer to such ar-
gument is that in so acting the legislature acts extra-consti-
tutionally as an agent of the people in doing an extra-consti-
tutional act. Such act is in no sense an exercise of the legis-
lative power given to the general assembly under the consti-
tution but is entirely independent thereof. 
When a legislature acts extra-constitutionally it steps 
from the legislative field into the political field, and by com-
mitting an unconstitutional act, it does so at the risk of 
misinterpreting the will of the people. Thus can the action 
of the General Assembly and of the people under the char-
ter of 1663 be explained. I t must be conceded that the gov-
ernment under the charter was definitely a constitutional 
government, which was required to observe the organization 
of government and the rights protected thereby as set forth 
in the charter and certain other documents which are to be 
found in the Digest of 1798, such as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the so-called Bill of Rights passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1798. (See Appendix A.) Although the 
General Assembly recognized the fact that the adoption of 
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a new constitution meant the abolition of the existing gov-
ernment, nevertheless, in view of the fact that no method of 
bringing about amendments to the existing government was 
prescribed, and in view of the public demand for some or-
derly and peaceful method of bringing about a change of 
government, the General Assembly relied upon political 
judgment in utilizing existing governmental machinery for 
organizing a constitutional convention. In so doing, i t ran 
the risk of being repudiated by the freemen, and as a matter 
of fact no convention was successful until 1842. But even 
under the necessities of the situation, the General Assembly 
deemed it politically wise to go no further than to "request" 
or "invite" the freemen or the people to choose delegates. In 
so doing, they merely gave the people the opportunity to ex-
ercise a political right which they had apart from the exist-
ing constitution or government, and to that extent they 
acted merely as an agency of their constituents. There was 
no attempt to legislate or to compel the holding of a conven-
tion and no exercise of legislative power. 
I t is our contention that there is no necessity for the leg-
islature to act extra-constitutionally in order to give the 
people an opportunity to amend the constitution in a man-
ner other than that prescribed in Article XI I I , since that 
method is ample for effecting any amendment desired by the 
people. In fact since 1842 eighteen such amendments have 
been adopted. In other words, the degree of necessity for 
such action which existed under the charter government does 
not exist under the present constitutional government. 
Furthermore, even if there is a demand for a new constitu-
tion, such new constitution can be obtained under the pro-
visions of Article XII I , and in fact such method was at-
tempted in 1898 and 1899, when a new constitution drafted 
by a legislative commission was submitted to the people and 
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rejected. As pointed out by the opinion of the judges in 
14 R. I. 649, such new constitution is no more than an 
amendment of the old, since it cannot create a different 
form of government but must conform to the requirements 
of the Constitution of the United States by providing for a 
Republican form of government. 
However, if the court sees fit to disregard such broad and 
fundamental reasoning and decides to construe narrowly the 
word "amendments" in Article X I I I and comes to the con-
clusion that a constitutional convention is proper for the 
framing of a "new" constitution, it is submitted that the leg-
islature, relying upon its political judgment and in the com-
mission of an extra-constitutional act, should proceed no 
further than did the legislature in 1853, when it submitted 
to the electors (1) the question whether they desired a con-
vention to frame a new constitution and (2) a "request" to 
choose delegates for such convention. In so doing the legis-
lature will not be acting in the exercise of legislative power 
but will merely be volunteer agents assisting their principals 
in an orderly, extra-constitutional manner to exercise a 
sovereign power to change their government. In other words, 
although the legislature has no constitutional power to ren-
der such service to the people, it may conclude that it is 
politically expedient to do so. However, with questions of 
political expediency this court is not concerned and it must 
confine itself to expressing the opinion that if such action 
is taken by the legislature it will be unconstitutional. 
The situation is perhaps better stated by the court in the 
case of Bennett vs. Jackson, supra. 
"The Legislature has no inherent rights. I ts powers 
are derived from the Constitution, and hence, where 
some action of the legislative body, which action is out-
side of the particular field fixed by the Constitution and 
is not strictly legislative within the meaning of section 
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1, art. 4, supra, is sought to be justified, a warrant for 
the same must be found somewhere; if not in the Con-
stitution, then directly from the people, who, by the 
terms of section 1, art . 1, of the Bill of Rights, have 
retained the right to amend or change their form of 
government. The right of the people in this regard is 
supreme, subject, however, to the condition that no new 
form of a Constitution can be established on the ruins 
of the old without some action on the part of the repre-
sentatives of the old, indicating their acquiescence 
therein; and, the General Assembly being the closest 
representative of the old, its approval must be obtained 
by some affirmative act. This is the only orderly way 
that could be conceived. The question then arises: 
How may these, the people and the Legislature, get to-
gether on this proposition? If no positive rule is pro-
vided by the fundamental law of the state, then, if a 
custom has prevailed for a sufficient length of years 
so that it is said to be fully established, that rule or 
custom must prevail. 
"It seems to be an almost universal custom in all of 
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself does 
not provide for the calling of a constitutional conven-
tion, to ascertain first the will of the people and procure 
from them a commission to call such a convention, be-
fore the Legislature proceeds to do so. The people be-
ing the repository of the right to alter or reform its 
government, its will and wishes must be consulted be-
fore the Legislature can proceed to call a convention. 
6 R. C. L. § 17, p. 27; Hoar, Constitution Conventions, 
p. 68 (1917)." 
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A R G U M E N T 
I. THE RHODE ISLAND CONSTITUTION CAN BE 
LEGALLY REVISED OR AMENDED ONLY AS AL-
LOWED IN ARTICLE XIII. 
This was the unanimous opinion of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island in answer to a request of 
the Senate in 1883. 
In Re Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649. 
This opinion has stood uncontradicted and uncriticized by 
our Court for fifty-two years. On two occasions it has re-
ceived implied approval. 
State vs. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 (1886). 
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors of Pawtucket, 27 R. I. 401 
(1905). 
In the lat ter opinion, rendered by a Court upon which there 
were none of the Judges sit t ing a t the time of the original 
opinion, the Court, referr ing to the opinion of 1883, s ta ted: 
"There it was held tha t the specified method of 
amending the Constitution was the only lawful method; 
and i t is difficult to imagine a reason for selecting one 
method out of several possible ones, if all the others 
are still to remain legal and available." 
The opinion of 1883 speaks for itself, and the acquiescence 
of the highest Court of the State in tha t opinion over the 
long period of years which has ensued, cannot be lightly 
disregarded. In the realm of Constitutions, long estab-
lished usage, conforming to the dicta of a Court of last 
resort, creates a strong presumption of constitutionality. 
When the usage of a people and the language of their high-
est Court concur for half a century, the Court itself must 
pause before lightly considering the enunciation of a dif-
ferent doctrine. This is the more t rue because it is a Con-
sti tution and not a mere s ta tute or other ordinary instru-
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ment which is being construed. In Cooley's Constitutional 
Limitations (8th) at p. 123, the author says: 
"A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments 
is that they are to receive an invarying interpretation 
and that their practical construction is to be uniform. 
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at 
one time and another at some subsequent time when 
the circumstances may have so changed as to make a 
different rule in the case seem desirable." 
See also 
South Carolina vs. United States, 199 U. S. 437. 
In a recent opinion of this Court, the decision was given 
and the Court then enunciated dicta covering a much wider 
field than the decision and at much greater length. Brere-
ton vs. Board of Canvassers, 55 R. I. (1935). This pro-
nouncement attempted to cover and lay down the law in 
regard to the marking of ballots at elections. If this opin-
ion should stand for fifty years and no cases of any kind 
were brought to the Court within the field covered by the 
dicta, and subsequent Courts should, in several instances 
cite the dicta with approval, it is submitted that a strong 
implication would arise that the dicta was law. 
Since this is, however, the identical question asked the 
Court in 1883, it seems proper to let that opinion and its 
language speak for itself and to brief the argument in favor 
of the conclusion there reached in the same fashion as if 
this were a question which the Court were approaching anew 
and upon which all pertinent arguments were desired. With 
this in mind, such argument will be taken up step by step. 
1. The Constitution itself clearly specifies ARTICLE XIII 
as the method for its alteration or revision. 
When the meaning of any instrument is desired, the 
method of approach is always first to consider the instru-
ment itself. In the world of hieroglyphics the pictures 
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themselves are considered. In a written instrument the 
first recourse is always to the words themselves and, if their 
meaning is clear, no fur ther search is necessary. This is a 
rule of common sense which has become embodied in the 
legal phrase that if the meaning of the instrument can be 
gathered from its own four corners, no outside construction 
is necessary. In Cooley on Constitutional Limitations 
(8th), pp. 123, 124, the author continues: 
"The object of construction, as applied to a written 
Constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people 
in adopting it. In the case of all written laws, it is the 
intent of the language that is to be enforced. But this 
intent is to be found in the instrument itself." 
And, as will be seen from the quotation above cited, it is 
accepted law that a Constitution shall be construed in the 
same method as applied to statutes and other written in-
struments. See 
Knight vs. Shelton, 134 Fed. 423. 
Shepard vs. Little Rock, 35 S. W. 2nd 261 (Ark.). 
Hoffman vs. Warden, 2 Fed. Supp. 353. 
12 C. J . 699, and cases cited. 
An examination of the instrument itself should, therefore, 
first be made to find its true intent. 
Downes vs. Midwell, 182 U. S. 244. 
Old Wayne Mutual Life Association vs. McDonough, 
204 U. S. 8. 
When this is done, it will be found that there is a specific 
Article entitled, "Of Amendments," consisting of Article 
X I I I and reading as follows:— 
" O F AMENDMENTS 
"The general assembly may propose amendments to 
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the 
members elected to each house. Such propositions for 
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and 
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of 
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state, with the names of all the members who shall have 
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town 
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions shall 
be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or notices by 
them issued, for warning the next annual town and 
ward meetings in April ; and the clerks shall read said 
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with 
the names of all the representatives and senators who 
shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before 
the election of senators and representatives shall be 
had. If a majority of all the members elected to each 
house, at said annual meeting, shall approve any propo-
sition thus made, the same shall be published and sub-
mitted to the electors in the mode provided in the act 
of approval; and if then approved by three-fifths of the 
electors of the state present and voting thereon in town 
and ward meetings, it shall become a part of the con-
stitution of the state." 
Here is an express method laid down for proposal and 
adoption of amendments to the Constitution. By its very 
title it is the place to which one would look for provisions 
in this regard. Nowhere else in the Constitution is there 
any expressed method of amendment or revision mentioned. 
In only two other places is there language which might 
even remotely bear upon the subject. 
Article I, Section 1, reads as follows: 
"Section 1. In the words of the Father of his Coun-
try, we declare that 'the basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and alter their con-
stitutions of government; but that the constitution 
which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit 
and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obliga-
tory upon a l l . ' " 
This seems clearly to be a declaration of right and not a 
grant of power to the Legislature or any other branch of 
the government. Clearly, there is no method of amendment 
or revision therein set forth. 
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Article IV, Sec. 10, reads as follows: 
"The general assembly shall continue to exercise the 
powers they have heretofore exercised unless prohibited 
in this constitution." 
This is a grant, but only a general grant, and there is cer-
tainly no express provision for amendment or revision 
therein contained. 
I t is to be noted that in no part of the Constitution is 
there any mention of a convention of any kind for any pur-
pose. 
I t is submitted that the Constitution itself thus clearly 
specifies Article X I I I as the method for any change to be 
made in the instrument. Since this is clear, the result 
should be accepted and there should be great reluctance in 
allowing a different conclusion to be reached by implication. 
There is a heavy burden upon those seeking to arrive at a 
conclusion inconsistent with the words of the instrument 
itself, and at variance with their natural meaning. With 
this method of approach in mind, it is proper to consider 
the instrument in the light of secondary rules of construc-
tion. 
2. The sole, express method for change specified in AR-
TICLE XIII prevents the strained fabrication of other 
methods by implication. 
I t is a universally accepted method of construction that 
the expression of one method of doing a thing prohibits the 
raising of other methods by implication. The basis of this 
rule is that expressed intention is stronger than any implica-
tion and hence an express, indicated method will be taken 
as mandatory as against possible different implications. I t 
purports to attach more significance to what is said than 
to what is left unsaid. This rule of construction is some-
times expressed in the Latin maxim: 
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 
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This is, however, more than a mere Latin maxim: it is a 
method of construction of universal application which has 
grown up from the experience of mankind in considering 
the essentials to ascertaining the intent of an instrument. 
This rule of construction, like other commonly accepted 
rules, applies to constitutions as well as to statutes and 
other instruments. See 
12 C. J . 699 and cases cited above. 
The application of this rule of construction in the instant 
problem is, of course, obvious. An attempt is made to raise 
by implication provision for a Constitutional Convention. 
One school of thought attempts to seek this result by raising 
the implication from the language of Article I, Section 1. 
A second school of thought seeks to reach the same result 
by fulsome implication from Article IV, Sec. 10. A third 
would imply the legal formation of such a Convention from 
fundamental principles of natural law. I t is not important 
at this point to consider the strength or weakness of these 
implications, but only to call attention to the fact that they 
are all implications. They, therefore, fall under the prohi-
bition of the rule of construction above stated, that, being 
implications, they give way to the intention of the instru-
ment as contained in an expressed provision. I t follows 
that Article X I I I contains the only method for change in 
the Constitution. 
This result, achieved by use of the well-established prin-
ciples of construction, is also just as clearly and conclusively 
reached if a general construction of the whole instrument 
is attempted, with the object of ascertaining its true intent. 
Since there is no other specific method set forth in the Con-
stitution, the only method known to American political in-
stitutions to achieve an amendment or revision would be 
that of a Constitutional Convention. In the absence of any 
specific method of calling such a Convention, i t would pre-
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sumably be done through the medium of the Legislature 
providing for a vote of the people as to whether such a Con-
vention should be established. 
Such a Convention, once in session, could make a whole 
new Constitution. The time which might elapse from the 
first step taken by the Legislature to the calling of such a 
Convention and the actual adoption of an entirely new Con-
stitution might be quite short. In any case, it might be far 
short of the time set forth in Article X I I I as necessary be-
fore taking action, namely, the time necessary for vote by 
two General Assemblies and the submission of the proposed 
amendment to the people. But it seems clear that Article 
X I I I provides for such delay in order that adequate con-
sideration may be given to any proposed amendment to the 
Constitution. Is it conceivable that the intent of the in-
strument is tha t there should be ample time for a considera-
tion of a single amendment but that the whole instrument 
might be radically changed or scrapped without such con-
sideration? It is no answer to such argument that a Con-
stitutional Convention is for the very purpose of deliberating 
upon fundamental changes in Constitutions and, therefore, 
an adequate safeguard. While a Constitutional Convention 
might result in ample deliberation and full consideration 
by the people of the proposals of the Convention, there is 
no assurance of such result. The apathy of the people to 
measures which are to them of vital importance often en-
dures for a short period of time, but such apathy does not 
continue in "all of the people all of the time." As time 
goes on, they become more conscious of the affairs of State. 
I t is for this reason that there is no adequate substitute for 
the time element embraced in Article XI I I . 
A second consideration is just as important. I t was ap-
parently recognized by our ancestors that a minority opinion 
needs protection and that it may be advisable, under certain 
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circumstances, that that minority be guaranteed certain 
rights and given such a guaranty tha t they may be deprived 
of those rights only by a vote of more than a bare majority 
at a given election. The philosophy of a 3/5 vote required 
under Article X I I I is just such. I t may even be based 
upon the thought that, considering the number who vote, a 
3/5 plurality is no more than an indication of the majority 
sentiment of the people. If such a vote is deemed necessary 
in order to make a minor change in the Constitution, what 
justification is there for disregarding this clear provision 
and setting up a method of change which will allow a com-
plete revision without such safeguards? 
These conclusions, apart from a careful study of the in-
strument itself, are made more striking by a consideration 
of what was in the minds of the members of the Convention 
of 1842 when the Constitution was adopted. Constitutional 
Conventions were not unknown to them. The United States 
Constitution had been framed in the most celebrated Con-
vention then or since known to history. Rhode Island had 
ratified the Federal Constitution by such a Convention 
elected by the people. Of the Constitutions existing in 
other States of the Union in 1842 many contained specific 
provisions for Constitutional Conventions. Such assem-
blies were, therefore, not unknown to those who drafted our 
Constitution at that time. If the safeguards of a Constitu-
tional Convention had been considered adequate and that 
method had been desired to be made available to us, pro-
vision could have been made in the Constitution. With 
amendment or revision by use of a Convention or by the 
method set forth in Article X I I I as possibilities, those who 
framed the Constitution chose the latter method with the 
safeguards which it included. 
Not only were there Constitutions then extant containing 
such provisions, but the question of Conventions, with its 
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various ramifications, had been at the very heart of the 
Dorr agitation, which had led to actual armed insurrection. 
The question had been agitated and almost fought over for 
years. Within a year two Conventions had been held, the 
People's Convention and the Land Owners' Convention; 
and twice ballots had been cast on the adoption of the in-
struments thus drafted. Never, perhaps, in the history of 
the world, did a Convention ever meet which was better 
acquainted with the possibilities of Constitutional Conven-
tions than that which drafted our present Constitution in 
1842. Not one of its members, for one instant, could have 
been unmindful of the other Conventions within the space 
of a few months. In this frame of mind, they drafted the 
Constitution and made no reference whatever to the use of 
Conventions as a method of altering the fundamental law. 
I t needs no use of Latin or stereotyped rules of construc-
tion, however valuable, to conclude that the makers of the 
present Constitution, knowing full well the meaning of Con-
stitutional Conventions, decided to set up, not that method, 
but another method, of effecting such changes. Judge 
Jameson may make a plausible assault on the Latin and 
the rule, but it is submitted that the realities are against 
him. See 
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, p. 605. 
If a homely example may be pardoned upon such a solemn 
question, it is submitted that the situation is similar to that 
of the draftsman of a Will under the Rhode Island statute 
which, as then worded, provided that children would take 
as if by intestacy unless the omission of a bequest to them 
appeared to be intentional. Under these circumstances, a 
widow's Will concisely contained only the following: 
"Having in mind my son William. I give everything 
to my son John." 
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It, is submitted that the intent of the Convention of 1842 
was, because of the above mentioned circumstances, much 
clearer than that of Daniel Webster when he reported to 
the Massachusetts Convention of 1820, as Chairman of the 
Committee on the subject of provisions for amendment to 
be written into the Constitution. The report as made and 
finally adopted provided that amendments might be adopted 
by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses of the Legislature, and a 
majority vote of the people. In the course of debate on 
the subject, Webster stated: 
" I t occurred to that committee that, with the expe-
rience that we had had of the Constitution, there was 
little probability, after the amendments which should 
now be adopted, there would ever be any occasion for 
great changes. No revision of its general principles 
would be necessary, and the alterations which should be 
called for by a change of circumstances would be limited 
and specific. I t was therefore the opinion of the com-
mittee that no provision for the revision of the whole 
Constitution was expedient, and the only question was 
in what manner it should be provided that particular 
amendments might be obtained." Deb. Mass. Conv. 
1820, pp. 413-414. 
I t is submitted that Webster and the Massachusetts Conven-
tion did not intend that a Constitutional Convention could 
be called under the adopted Constitution. (Jameson on 
Constitutional Conventions, p. 613.) The assertion of 
Jameson that such is not i ts meaning is not at all convinc-
ing. And if that was the intention of the Massachusetts 
Convention, the same philosophy may have led to the con-
clusion of the Rhode Island Convention of twenty-two years 
later. The fact that Massachusetts later changed its Con-
stitution by a Convention is beside the point, since the 
legality of such procedure was not raised prior to its be-
coming a fait accompli. 
The Constitution does not make a Convention impossible; 
it merely makes a Convention illegal unless it is brought 
about in the only method possible in accordance with the 
terms of the instrument. If it is desired that provision be 
made for a Convention, all that is necessary is to amend 
Article X I I I in accordance with its terms, so as to allow a 
Convention to be set up for the purpose of revising the Con-
stitution. A provision permitting a Convention would 
seem to be a typical amendment to the present Constitution 
and, when once adopted, a Convention could then be called 
in accordance with its terms. This is legal and orderly 
procedure. I t was accepted procedure even prior to the 
opinion of 1883. In 1882, in accordance with the provisions 
of Article XI I I , there had passed the second successive Gen-
eral Assembly a provision to amend that Article itself so as 
to allow the use of Conventions to revise the Constitution. 
See 
Acts and Resolves, May 1882, p. 7. 
This was submitted to the people and rejected by a vote of 
4.393 to 5,121. This recent usage was before the Court 
when it rendered its opinion and might have been cited as 
confirming usage, if the Court had felt any need of further 
buttressing its reasons. 
If there were no method of amending the present Consti-
tution, i t is arguable that there would be, of necessity, a 
power to call a Convention and revise or amend the Con-
stitution. Likewise, if the method of amending the present 
Constitution was such as practically to preclude amend-
ments of any kind, i t might be interpreted as being, in effect, 
a negation of amendment, and an argument could be made 
that the right of revision existed and could, perhaps, be ex-
ercised otherwise. This argument, however, is not available 
in regard to the Rhode Island Constitution, which has been 
amended on fourteen occasions by the adoption of eighteen 
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separate Articles, in such manner that the amendments to 
the Constitution are, in length, equal to approximately three-
fourths of the Constitution. 
If it seems advisable to revise the whole Constitution, 
that can be accomplished under the present provisions. Let 
a Commission draf t a new Constitution, submit it to the 
Legislature for proposal, and later to the people for adop-
tion, under the provisions of Article XI I I . This procedure 
was actually followed in 1898 and the proposed Constitution 
was rejected by the vote of the people. Again in 1915, the 
same procedure was followed, except that on this occasion 
the proposals were not passed by the General Assembly. It, 
therefore, cannot be argued that there is not abundant pro-
vision not only for amendment of separate Articles, but for 
the entire revision of our present fundamental instrument 
of government within clearly legal and orderly procedure. 
3. The arguments in support of the contention that the 
constitution permits amendment or revision by a con-
stitutional convention are unsound. 
Against the conclusions set forth above, arguments have 
been made with several different theories as their basis. The 
fact that the opposition is based upon several theories in 
itself indicates a lack of clear demarcation as to the rea-
sons for the conclusion, and, as pointed out below, includes 
also a certain inconsistency in argument among those who 
seek the same conclusion. This suggests the possibility 
that the opposition is motivated by a desire to seek reasons 
to support a desired result rather than by the attempt to 
consider the facts and draw such deductions from them 
as will achieve the proper conclusion. I t seems proper, 
therefore, to consider in brief the varying theories of the 
opposition. 
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A. Article I, Section 1, contains no grant of 
power to revise the constitution by a con-
vention. 
This involves the first school of thought among the op-
position, namely, that this section, in and of itself, is a grant 
of such power, but it seems at once upon reading this sec-
tion that it is a general declaration of principles rather 
than a grant of power. So general are its terms that this 
conclusion is inevitable. Furthermore, the word "alter" is 
clearly synonymous with the word "amend," as contained 
in Article X I I I and hence, so far as "altering" or "amend-
ing" are concerned, there would seem to be no question 
that this section is merely a general declaration, the 
method for the carrying out of which is contained in the 
subsequent Article. The word "make" would, under 
ordinary circumstances, refer to the initial construction, 
namely, the adoption of the original instrument. In that 
context, the declaration is, of course, literally true. On the 
other hand, if the phrase "make and alter" is considered 
together, having in mind a general revision or a specific 
amendment, clearly the whole phrase relates only to the 
type of thing possible under Article XI I I , as set forth above. 
The power intended to be granted or set up under this 
Section is, however, more clearly seen when consideration 
is given to the action of the Convention of 1842 at the time 
the Constitution was adopted. A motion was made to 
amend this section by inserting in place of it the following: 
"All political power and sovereignty are originally 
vested in, or, of right, belong to the people. All free 
governments are founded in their authority and are 
established for the greatest good of the whole number. 
The people have, therefore, an inalienable and inde-
feasible right, in their original sovereign and unlimited 
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capacity, to ordain and institute government, and, in 
the same capacity, to alter, reform or totally change the 
same whenever their safety or happiness requires." 
There was immediate opposition to this amendment and it 
was rejected. I t will be seen at a glance that an argu-
ment could be made that this proposed amendment was at-
tempting to set up in the people themselves a certain right 
which i t was claimed could not be delegated. Even then, 
the existence of such a right in its conflict with Article X I I I 
would have been doubtful. By the ordinary canons of con-
struction, however, the fact that a provision more clearly 
implying the existence of such a right was rejected, leads 
to the conclusion that those who were framing our present 
Constitution had no intention of setting up such a provision. 
In that original Convention, on the contrary, there was 
apparently a desire to let it appear in the fundamental in-
strument that sovereignty was in the people and that the 
voice sounded by the agencies of government was always 
the voice of the people. With this in mind they turned to 
the words of Washington in his Farewell Address and 
quoted them in Article I, Section 1. In choosing these 
words, they must, of course, have had reference to the con-
text in which they appeared in the Farewell Address and 
were undoubtedly familiar with the thought in the mind 
of the Father of his Country when he used these phrases. 
Because one striking sentence might have appeared in 
that oration would hardly have led the convention of free 
citizens to adopt and quote that sentence when they were 
entirely out of sympathy with its context and the thought 
of its writer. I t is, therefore, important to see the theme 
upon which Washington was discoursing and the context 
in which these words were used. Reference to the whole 
paragraph in which these words appear and the two suc-
ceeding paragraphs will disclose without question what the 
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first President had in mind. He had been the head of a 
government founded upon revolution. That government 
had succeeded to a marked extent. There still were, how-
ever, dissents within it. There still was fear of violent op-
position to the central authority. Washington knew these 
facts. He knew that Revolution had been used to establish 
their institutions. He was not, however, delivering an 
eulogy of that method. He was not commemorating that 
event. On the contrary, he was struck with the sober 
thought that while such means were occasionally necessary 
and advisable, the danger to a free government once estab-
lished was in the use on subsequent occasions of the same 
means. With this in mind, he uttered the words quoted in 
our Constitution and then went on specifically to warn 
against departure from orderly principles. 
"All obstructions to the execution of the Laws, all 
combinations and associations, under whatever plausi-
ble character, with (the real) design to direct, control, 
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action 
of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this 
fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency . . ." 
* * * 
"Toward the preservation of your Government and 
the permanency of your present happy state, i t is 
requisite, not only tha t you steadily discountenance ir-
regular opposition to its acknowledged authority, but 
also that you resist with care (the) spirit of innovation 
upon its principles however specious the pretexts. One 
method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the 
Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy 
of the system, (and thus to) undermine what cannot 
be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which 
you may be invited, remember that time and habit are 
at least as necessary to fix the true character of Gov-
ernments, as of other human institutions—that experi-
ence is the surest standard, by which to test the real 
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tendency of the existing Constitution of a Country— 
that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothe-
sis and opinion exposes to perpetual change from the 
endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; . . . " 
I t is submitted that any fair construction of the words 
of Article I, Section 1, put back into their original context, 
will disclose that they are not intended as the basis for ex-
traordinary assemblies to accomplish fundamental changes 
in government. On the contrary, it is clear that the empha-
sis in the quoted portion of this address is upon the second 
part and that the primary purpose in the pronouncement 
was to warn the people "that the Constitution which at any 
time exists, till changed by an explicit or authentic act of 
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all." 
If this be true, where should one look for an "explicit or 
authentic act of the whole people"? 
Article X I I I is "explicit." Action under Article X I I I 
would be "authentic." An adoption of a change under 
Article XI I I must be by the "whole people." The "whole 
people" are represented in government by the electors. The 
"whole people" can set up such procedure as they see fit and 
if they desire to provide that changes in their fundamental 
law shall be accomplished only by 3/5 vote, no other vote is 
an act of the "whole people." 
I t is submitted that a fair consideration of Article I, 
Section 1, word by word, aside from its original context, its 
general meaning as derived from its original context, or its 
proper interpretation in the light of the action of the Rhode 
Island Convention in rejecting a substitute, can lead only 
to the conclusion that i t does not provide a method for 
amending or revising the Constitution in addition to, and, 
in spirit, at variance with, Article XII I . 
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B. There is no inherent, inalienable right in 
the majority of the people under the Con-
stitution to revise the Constitution con-
trary to and in spite of the provisions 
contained within it. 
This refers to a second school of thought. Those who hold 
this view quote Article I, Section 1, but do not see in it any 
specific grant but only general significance. They use it 
as a text for the proposition that there is an inherent, in-
alienable right in the majority to revise the fundamental 
instrument of government and that this right cannot be con-
trolled or curbed. From the discussion above, it will be 
seen how much solace such a philosophy can draw from the 
words of Washington. A consideration of the above will 
disclose that any fair-minded person will conclude that it is 
the very type of thing of which he was afraid and concerning 
which he was advising the new Nation. This leaves this 
particular school of thought without Washington as proper 
authority. 
These people of necessity must go the full distance which 
their philosophy dictates. Even if there were a specific 
provision in the Constitution whereby a Convention might 
be called, they take the attitude that that provision itself is 
subject to fundamental, natural law relating to the inherent 
rights of a sovereign people said to reside in a majority. 
Of course, there is such a right, perhaps more properly 
called a power. I t is a power, of course, in the realm of 
political science, defined as the "right of revolution." Wash-
ington had i t in mind and was warning against it. He 
recognized it, but he recognized it quite separately from the 
powers contained in the fundamental instrument of govern-
ment. 
The argument in favor of such an inherent, inalienable 
sovereignty in the people was that made by Hallett in the 
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case of Luther vs. Borden, 1 How. (U. S.) 1, in which he 
drew the striking picture of a whole people assembled on 
a plain and assumed that sovereign power was present. 
Jameson, in striking language, denies this conclusion, even 
if it were physically possible for every last citizen so to as-
semble, and says that under those circumstances such an 
assembly 
"clearly would have no constitutional or legal right to 
pass an ordinance at all. Such an assemblage would 
not constitute, in a political sense, The People. The 
people of a State is the political body—the corporate 
unit—in which are vested, as we have seen, the ultimate 
powers of sovereignty; not its inhabitants or population 
considered as individuals, . . . except as an organized 
body and except when acting by its recognized organs, 
the entire population of a State, already constituted, 
were it assembled on some vast plain, could not con-
stitutionally pass a law or try an offender." 
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 225. 
The same authority, af ter making reference to Hallett 's 
argument as a "most ingenious defense of anarchial prin-
ciples," goes on to state that Webster's argument in opposi-
tion is the classical enunciation of true principle in this 
field. This argument of Webster, Jameson succinctly sum-
marizes in part as follows: 
" . . . that not only do the people limit their govern-
ments, National and State,—it is another principle, 
equally true and important, that they often limit them-
selves; that they set bounds to their own powers; secur-
ing the institutions which they establish against the 
sudden impulses of mere majorities; thus, by the Fif th 
Article of the Constitution, Congress, two-thirds of both 
Houses concurring, may propose amendments of the 
Constitution, or, on application of the Legislatures of 
the States, may call a convention—the amendments 
proposed, in either case, to be ratified by the Legisla-
tures or Conventions of three-fourths of the States: . . . 
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That it is in these modes we are to ascertain the Will 
of the American People and that our Constitutions and 
Laws know no other mode; that we are not to take the 
Will of the People from public meetings, nor from 
tumultuous assemblies by which the timid are terrified, 
the prudent alarmed, and society disturbed." [Italics 
ours] 
See also 
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 229. 
See also Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 56. 
The right of a majority to enforce its will, exclusive of the 
method provided by the fundamental law, is the right of 
revolution. I t is that described in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as "the right of the people to alter or abolish it 
(the government)." That Declaration was a revolutionary 
document, and the right so asserted is a right of revolution 
whether it be specifically contained in a revolutionary docu-
ment or be impliedly urged as abiding in a people living 
under a Constitution. 
And it is no answer to this clear statement of principle 
that such Conventions have been held and the governments 
set up under them have continued to exist. Revolution may 
be peaceful and accepted, but it is, nevertheless, revolution. 
Jameson in commenting upon three such Conventions, 
strikingly concludes:— 
"I t is obvious that to justify such proceedings on 
legal grounds would be to take away from the funda-
mental law, that characteristic quality by which it is 
the Law of Laws—the supreme law of the land. If it 
is not the supreme law, for all purposes of a Constitu-
tion, in the American sense, it might as well be a piece 
of blank paper." 
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 221, 
et 8eq. 
There is another principle established by authority and 
accepted for its reasoning, which is fundamentally incon-
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sistent with the claimed inherent, inalienable right of the 
people to a Convention. This is the principle that where 
the Constitution contains a provision for specific method 
of amendment, a particular amendment can be adopted only 
in that fashion and not by a Convention for the purpose 
of that amendment alone. This was the opinion of the 
Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
answer to a question of the House of Representatives in 
1832. 
Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. 
Furthermore, as observed by the Justices of the Massa-
chusetts Court in the opinion cited, it is presumed that it 
was not the intention of the Governor to request an opinion 
upon natural rights, nor the effect of changes sanctioned by 
people in emergencies, but 
"We presume, therefore, that the opinion requested 
applies to the existing Constitution and laws of the 
Commonwealth, and the rights and powers derived from 
and under them." 
A following of the procedure indicated by the Massachu-
setts Court is bound to reach the conclusion that under the 
Rhode Island Constitution, there is no inherent, inalienable 
right in the majority of the people to change that instrument 
without regard to the provisions of it. 
C . The general grant of power in Section 10 
of Article IV contains no power to revise 
or amend the Constitution. 
Article IV, Sec. 10, reads as follows: 
"The general assembly shall continue to exercise the 
powers they have heretofore exercised unless prohibited 
in this Constitution." 
The argument of those who attach significance to this 
clause sufficient to achieve their desired result, is that since 
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the General Assembly, prior to 1842, had called Constitu-
tional Conventions, that power still resides in them under 
the above quoted section. A consideration of the facts will 
disclose the weakness of this argument. 
Prior to 1842, the General Assembly had extraordinary 
powers under the Charter of King Charles, then our Consti-
tution. I t was restricted in few ways. The present Constitu-
tion, however, defined and restricted grants of power, and in 
order tha t there might be no question in regard to the power 
of the Legislature, there was inserted in Article V, Section 
1, entitled, "Of the Legislative Power," at the very beginning 
the following: 
"This constitution shall be the supreme law of the 
state, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void." 
The Constitution, therefore, was made supreme and the 
legislative power was subject to the Constitution and the re-
sults of the Constitution which fair construction might reach. 
I t is also clear that the grant contained in Section 10, 
above quoted, is a general grant and if it contains any power 
in regard to Constitutional Conventions, it does so by impli-
cation only. If this is so, it has been pointed out above that 
an implied grant is negatived by an express grant in another 
part of the instrument, when the two are inconsistent. 
Section 10, therefore, can only be of importance if, on a 
fa i r construction of the whole Constitution, the power sought 
to be implied is present. If, on such construction, the impli-
cation of such a power is absent, Section 10 will not help. 
This is most clearly seen here in Rhode Island by the case of 
Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. That case decided that the ju-
dicial power of the State was in the Courts and not in the 
Legislature. There was urged against this conclusion the 
full force of Section 10, above quoted, and it was conclusive-
ly shown that the Legislature not only under the King 
Charles Charter, but af ter its adoption, had exercised judi-
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cial powers. The Rhode Island Court, however, stated that 
the Constitution was a new instrument that had to be inter-
preted to accomplish the object for which it was established, 
and that the powers and rights under it would not be unduly 
influenced by such a general grant as contained in the cited 
section. This was stated clearly at Page 355, where, in ref-
erence to the Legislature, it was stated: 
"Strong as it is, however, it is, alike with the other 
departments of the government, powerless before the 
Constitution, and the will of the people, which that in-
strument expresses." 
If the implications of this fundamental instrument made 
necessary to accomplish its general intent are strong enough 
to overcome any arguable grant under Section 10, how futi le 
it is to contend that the specific, express method of amend-
ment in Article X I I I is rendered surplusage by this general 
grant! 
Furthermore, early Rhode Island history discloses that 
there was never a willingness to accept too extraordinary 
powers as residing wholly in the General Assembly. The 
early towns claimed the right to nullify acts of the General 
Assembly. A specific town constituting a clear minority of 
the people claimed that similar right. With this history and 
in the face of the language of Article XI I I , there should be 
great hesitation in so construing our fundamental law that 
the safeguards against change set up by the people themselves 
in specific words were not intended to be more than mere 
words, since a quicker accomplishment of the same result by 
a smaller vote is at all times possible. 
4. The Opinion of the Judges of 1883 is the only direct 
authority upon the specific question. 
In the field of fundamental law involved in the construc-
tion of Constitutions, a local precedent is a fa r greater au-
thority than any observations by foreign Courts. In the gen-
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eral field of law involving general customs, usage, commerce, 
etc., the precedents of other Courts are of the greatest im-
portance, even though not controlling. That this is so is dem-
onstrated by the calling of the field the "common law." In 
the realm of sovereignty, we are, however, a State unto our-
selves, not the national State, it is true, but, nevertheless, a 
sovereign State. Under these circumstances, the opinion of 
our own Court and the acquiescence in it over a period of 
years should be controlling as against any outside precedent. 
This does not, however, justify ignoring any possible light to 
be derived from outside opinion and, accordingly, the refer-
ence should, perhaps, be made to such possible authorities. 
The extended argument above in relation to the reasons 
for arriving at the indicated conclusion that a constitutional 
convention makes it unnecessary again to cover that field by 
considering the arguments in text books upon this subject. 
I t is true that writers upon the general topic have not agreed 
with the decision of 1883, but since the authority of such au-
thors is based upon the cogency of their reasoning and has 
not the weight of a decision, the only importance to be at-
tached to their att i tude is in consideration of the arguments 
involved in comparison with the reasonable approach to this 
question indicated above. 
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, 
Section 570, 574d. 
Dodd on The Revision and Amendment of State Con-
ventions, pp. 45, 56. 
Hoar on Constitutional Conventions, pp. 43, 48. 
In some of the texts and in one or two opinions, there has 
been used loose language which would indicate that there 
were decisions actually contrary to that of the Rhode Island 
Court in 1883. At least, that is what is ordinarily meant 
when the term "weight of authority" is used. A careful con-
sideration of the decided cases, however, reveals that in all 
290 
instances the references are merely to dicta and there is not 
one case in a Court of last resort actually decided contrary 
to the opinion of 1883. 
I t must first be observed that the only authority cited in 
the opinion of 1883 was the Opinion of the Justices of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 6 Cushing, 573. 
Certainly, that decision in general was upon the same subject, 
and while attempts have been made technically to cut down 
its meaning, a fair consideration of the thought of the Court 
is bound to lead to the conclusion that if the Massachusetts 
Court had been asked the question put to the Rhode Island 
Court in 1883, the answer would have been the same. And 
it is no answer to the weight to be attributed to that opinion 
to state that thereafter in Massachusetts a constitutional con-
vention was held without a change in the constitution. The 
legality of that convention was not raised in the courts, and 
after it had once been held and a constitution purported to 
have been adopted and officers elected under it, there was no 
way to raise the question of its legality. 
There are certain cases sometimes cited as being at vari-
ance with the opinion of the Rhode Island Court. 
Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39. 
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59. 
Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100. 
State vs. Powell, 77 Miss. 543. 
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81. 
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336. 
State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., 137 La. 403. 
A consideration of the cases themselves will, of course, 
reveal to what extent they have purported to cover the topic 
involved in the present question, but just a word by way 
of reference to them may not be out of place. 
In Wells vs. Bain, supra, the decision was upon the ques-
tion as to whether the supervision of the balloting relating 
to a convention should be by ordinance of the convention or 
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under the general laws passed by the legislature. The Court 
did imply the existence of a power to create a constitutional 
convention, but in doing so i t was considering the language 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which stated that the 
people "have a t all times an inalienable and indefeasible 
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such 
manner as they may think proper." The significance of 
this provision is more clearly recognized in the second Penn-
sylvania case of Wood's Appeal, supra. In that case, at 
Page 70, the Court, speaking of the above provision of the 
constitution, stated:— 
" I t defines no manner or mode in which the people 
shall proceed to exercise their right, but leaves that to 
their after choice. Until then it is unknown how they 
will proceed, or what powers they will confer on their 
delegates." 
And again, at Page 72, the Court states:— 
"The calling of a Constitutional Convention and the 
regulating of its action by law is not forbidden in the 
Constitution. It is a conceded manner [italics in 
original opinion] through which the people may exer-
cise the right reserved in the Bill of Rights. I t falls, 
therefore, within the protection of the Bill of Rights, 
as a very manner in which the people may proceed to 
amend the Constitution . . . . " 
The construction of the right to call a convention under 
such a provision is clearly apparent as a possibility, and 
the Court so stated. This provision is, of course, fa r dif-
ferent than the provision in Article I, Section 1, of the 
Rhode Island Constitution. It is also true, in Wood's Ap-
peal, that the Court openly stated that since the convention 
had been held and the new constitution adopted, under 
which the Court was holding, there could be no review of its 
legality. This appears in the opening sentence where the 
Court s tates: 
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"The change made by the people in their political 
institutions by the adoption of the proposed Constitu-
tion since this decree, forbids an inquiry into the 
methods of this case. The question is no longer 
judicial . . . " 
From that opening point onward, the case is dicta. 
In Collier vs. Frierson, supra, the question was as to the 
validity of the adoption of a certain amendment to the con-
stitution in view of the fact tha t i t had been omitted from 
the Resolution at one of the sessions of the General As-
sembly. In State vs. Powell, supra, the question was a 
similar one in relation to the validity of the adoption of an 
amendment. In each of these cases, there is but a single 
sentence which bears at all upon the question at issue in 
the instant case, and that sentence is wholly unnecessary to 
the decision. 
In State vs. Dahl, supra, the question was the validity of 
a mode of procedure by the General Assembly in relation to 
amending the constitution, as to whether a joint Resolution 
or an actual legal Act was required. The Court expressly 
stated at the end of the opinion that it was not necessary to 
pass upon the question as to whether a constitutional con-
vention could be held. I t then went on to state that the 
weight of authority and precedent was in favor of such 
power, citing "Jameson, Const. Conv., ss 570, 574d; In Re 
Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649; Opinion of Justices 
of Supreme Court, 6 Cush. 573." 
Since Jameson cites no judicial opinions to uphold his 
point of view, the North Dakota Court is in the peculiar 
position of stating a proposition as law, which is the exact 
opposite of that held by the only cited cases. 
In Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, the decision involved the 
legality of an attempt to submit a new constitution with-
out compliance with the amending clause of the old consti-
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tution. In a long opinion upon this subject, numerous 
quotations are made and arguments proposed, but all, with 
the exception of the above decision, are dicta. 
In State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., supra, some 
dictum appears but the case itself apparently involves the 
extraordinary decision that par t of the very constitution, 
under which the Court held, was not effective, although the 
constitution had been adopted as a whole. Under these 
circumstances, it is not extraordinary that a dissenting 
Judge should have stated, in declaring the Court to be with-
out jurisdiction: 
"Our authority or jurisdiction cannot rise higher 
than its source." 
I t is submitted that it is extraordinary, indeed, if, as 
alleged by certain text book writers, the weight of authority 
is against the Rhode Island opinion of 1883, to find that 
there are no actual decisions to that effect. Such decisions 
would be expected to be in corroboration of the action of 
other branches of the government and, therefore, the type 
of decision which the Court would not hesitate to give, even 
though the question be somewhat political in its nature. 
However, there are none such. On the other hand, one 
would not expect to find cases on all fours with the Rhode 
Island decision. In only a few States are advisory opinions 
of the Justices legal, and it is in one of these, Massachusetts, 
that there appears the opinion closest to that of the Rhode 
Island Court. When a convention, regardless of legality, 
is actually being called or in existence, the judicial branch 
of the government is always loathe to interfere and enter-
tain jurisdiction. I t foresees that the result may ensue 
despite its decision and realizes the probable impotency in 
what it may decide. What is t rue at the time is clearer 
still af ter the convention has been held and the new con-
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stitution adopted. The Court then is in this dilemma: I t 
can decide that it is holding over, deriving its authority 
from the old Constitution. In this case, as a Court it has 
no executive or legislative branch available to carry out its 
decisions, and thus it stands as a mere academic tribunal. 
Or it can decide that it is holding under the new constitu-
tion; but it then follows that it has taken an oath to up-
hold that constitution and it does not then lie in its power 
to declare as of no effect the sine qua non of its own very 
existence. 
See 
Wood's Appeal, supra. 
State vs. American Sugar Refining Company, 
(Dissenting Opinion), supra. 
The fact that this is so means that one would expect to find 
precedents in action taken which would not, under ordinary 
circumstances, bear the scrutiny of judicial inquiry as to 
legality under the ordinary processes of decision. 
I t is, therefore, submitted, on reason and authority, that 
the Rhode Island opinion of 1883 should be followed by the 
Court in answering the questions now before it, and the 
method of approach is well laid down by Judge Cooley in 
Bay City vs. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, a t p. 506: 
"Constitutions do not change with the varying tides 
of public opinion and desire: the will of the people 
therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed 
by their own deliberate action, and i t cannot be permis-
sible to the Courts that, in order to aid evasions and 
circumventions, they shall subject these instruments 
. . . to a construction as if they were great public ene-
mies standing in the way of progress, and the duty of 
every good citizen was to get around the provisions 
whenever practicable and give them a damaging thrust 
whenever convenient. They must construe them as the 
people did at their adoption, if the means of arriving 
at that construction are within their power." 
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In 1842 a Constitutional Convention, only too well ac-
quainted with Conventions, chose to omit provision for such 
a convention; in 1882 the people of Rhode Island, at the polls, 
indicated their opposition to the inclusion in our fundamen-
tal law of a provision for such convention; in 1883 our high-
est Court rendered the opinion that the constitution did not 
permit the calling of a convention, and that opinion has been 
referred to with approval on two subsequent occasions. The 
Rhode Island Constitution in 1935 is the Constitution of 
1842, 1882, and 1883, and it is to be hoped tha t its meaning 
remains the same. 
II. EVEN IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN CALL A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, IT M U S T 
FIRST RECEIVE AUTHORITY TO DO SO BY A 
REFERENDUM TO THE PEOPLE. 
Assuming that this Court arrives at the conclusion that 
the provisions of the present constitution of Rhode Island do 
not prevent the calling of a constitutional convention in this 
state,—in other words, that the opinion of the justices found 
in 14 R. I. 649 is unsound,—there still remains to be answered 
the question of how such a convention may be called, how it 
may be constituted, the extent of its powers, and the method 
of finally adopting the new constitution when drafted. The 
next section of the brief will be devoted to a consideration 
of the methods of calling such a convention. 
1. The Development of the Law of Constitutional Con-
ventions. 
The constitutional convention as we know it is of modern 
origin, and such conventions are of two classes,—first, con-
stitutional, and second, revolutionary. We will treat only 
of the first class. The two conventions most frequently re-
ferred to as a starting point are those of 1660 and 1689 in 
England, and they were revolutionary. Owing to the liberal 
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powers given to Parliament by custom and practice, this sys-
tem of law, as we know it, has not arisen in that country. 
The English system of parliamentary government has no 
written constitution or constitutional law in the sense that 
we have one. 
The constitutional convention was largely a development 
from the conditions surrounding the Revolutionary War. I t 
was the result of the emergency and the growth of the un-
usual times which surrounded the reconstruction period of 
this country during the years following the Revolutionary 
War. Too much weight should not be given to the precedents 
established prior to the period about 1800. They may be help-
ful, but the conditions under which they were given must be 
carefully considered. From 1800 to the period of the seces-
sion movement in the South about 1860, conventions were 
with few exceptions called and conducted in the ordinary 
way with much regularity. Similarly the constitutional con-
ventions of the period from 1860 to 1870 were in general so 
closely connected with the secession movement and the Civil 
War, either directly, as in the case of seceding states, or in-
directly, as the result of the reconstruction period following 
the war, that they are of little value as precedents. The pe-
riod from about 1870 to 1895 or 1900 was a period when the 
calling of conventions continued to gain both as to the meth-
od of their calling and as to their operations in a logical and 
established manner. (Dodd, The Revision and Amendment 
of State Constitutions, Chap. 2.) In Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 
Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, the Court said: 
"The formation of Constitutions in the Revolutionary 
and reconstruction periods of our history and instances 
* * which involved the validity of a Constitution sub-
mitted to the people by the territorial Legislature, and 
by which a state government was instituted, are obvi-
ously distinguishable." 
297 
And in Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59, the Court said: 
"No argument for the implied power of absolute sov-
ereignty in a convention can be drawn from revolution-
ary times when necessity begets a new government." 
The methods of calling constitutional conventions and the 
powers of the people over their conventions have now taken 
definite form and are quite well established. Even after giv-
ing effect to the above comments, however, there is still left 
an amount of material for consideration upon the questions 
before us. This material may be divided into two general 
classes, which in order of their importance as legal authori-
ties are,— 
(1) Decisions of courts in contested cases; 
(2) Opinion and comments of individual jurists, text 
writers and others. 
2. The Sovereignty of the People. 
Underlying every decision of a court, every opinion of a 
justice, and every comment by a jurist, must be the funda-
mental idea of all constitutional law, so well stated in Ar-
ticle I, Section 1 of the present Constitution of Rhode Island, 
tha t 
"the basis of our political systems is the right of the 
people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment; but that the constitution which at any time ex-
ists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the 
whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all." 
I t would be impossible, however, as Jameson says, for the 
people in a modern state to gather as one unit "on one great 
plain" and, if they so gathered, there to transact the affairs 
of state. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitation 
(8th Ed., 1927), Vol. I, page 81, says: 
"The theory of our political system is that the ulti-
mate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs 
all legitimate authority." 
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and again at page 82: 
" * * * as a practical effect, the sovereignty is 
vested in those persons who are permitted by the con-
stitution of the state to exercise the electors' franchise." 
Jus t as "necessity, the mother of invention," has brought 
into existence the idea of representative government and 
the legislature as an expression thereof, so too in any gov-
ernment of law, necessity requires that some legally con-
stituted body, presumably the legislature, take the initial 
step of submitting to the people the question of such a con-
vention. The authorities are practically unanimous, how-
ever, in holding such submission of the question to be the 
limit of the power of the then existing legislature, this prin-
ciple arising from the fundamental fact that the making of 
a new constitution is a sovereign act of the sovereign people 
and the necessary corollary that the legislature acts not 
under powers previously delegated to it by the people, but 
as an agent of necessity. 
The present legislature of Rhode Island derives its au-
thority from the Constitution of 1842, which provides no 
mechanism for a constitutional change by the convention 
method. In the absence thereof (assuming that the calling 
of a convention is nevertheless permissible) the legislature 
can act only in the submission of the question to the people 
of the calling of a convention, by force of necessity, as the 
only body reasonably available to provide a mechanism for 
ascertaining the wishes of the sovereign people from whom 
it and the whole existing government draw their powers. 
When acting in this capacity as an agent of the sovereign 
people it acts not under the rights conferred upon it by 
the Constitution of the state, but as the voluntary agent of 
what is sometimes referred to as the fourth department of 
our state, namely, the people acting in their sovereign right. 
That the sovereignty vests in the people is an accepted fact, 
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but from such fact it does not follow that there has been 
any delegation of authority to the legislature to initiate pro-
ceedings for a constitutional convention. Even after a con-
vention is organized, the extent of its authority may be 
questioned. 
During the early part of the nineteenth century it was 
sometimes argued that the people's sovereignty was delegated 
to the convention and that it and it alone had the full rights 
of the people when once called into being, but this theory is 
no longer accepted. Dodd says in his work at page 77: 
"The theory of conventional sovereignty has been 
advanced by speakers for several conventions beginning 
with that in New York in 1821, but no convention 
seems, however, to have attempted to act upon the 
theory or even to have endorsed it." 
Probably the best summary of the powers of a convention 
is found in Dodd, p. 77-80, where he says: 
"Under Judge Jameson's theory a constitutional con-
vention called by a vote of the people may be restricted 
by simple legislative act so that it may not revise or 
propose the revision of any part of the existing con-
stitution which the legislature may forbid it to touch. 
The convention is made subordinate to an organ of the 
existing government. Judge Jameson proceeded on 
the assumption that a constitutional convention must 
possess sovereign power—that is, all of the power of 
the state—or that it must be strictly subordinate to the 
regular legislature. He could conceive of no middle 
ground between these extremes. In attempting to de-
molish the theory that the convention is sovereign, he 
went to the other extreme and really made the legis-
lature the supreme body with respect to the alteration 
of state constitutions, for under his view a convention 
may be restrained by a legislature as to what shall be 
placed in the constitution, and no alteration can be 
made without legislative consent. Judge Jameson 
pushed his theory to its logical conclusion and held that 
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a convention, even after elected and assembled, might 
be dissolved by legislative act, or that the legislature 
might prevent the submission of its work to the peo-
ple. . . . The better view would seem to be that the 
convention is a regular organ of the state (although as 
a rule called only at long intervals)—neither sovereign 
nor subordinate to the legislature, but independent 
within its proper sphere. Under this view the legis-
lature cannot bind the convention as to what shall be 
placed in the convention, or as to the exercise of its 
proper duties." 
Judge Jameson would deny all sovereign power to the con-
vention and make it an instrument of the legislature, but 
Dodd says of his work (p. 77, note 10),— 
"Judge Jameson's work may be said to have been 
written to disprove the theory that a convention has 
sovereign power, and under these conditions the theory 
assumed in his mind a much more important position 
than it ever attained in fact." 
We may conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of sovereign 
power is today that it rests in the people and extends to the 
convention or other agency of the people only so fa r as is ex-
pressly and clearly given by them. In no sense does it rest 
in the legislature, except so fa r as it is voluntarily assumed 
by the legislature as a voluntary agent to initiate the sub-
mission of the question of the calling of a convention to the 
people and in the calling of a convention when so approved. 
See Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 583; 116 N. E. 921, where 
the court says: 
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all of 
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself 
does not provide for the calling of a constitutional con-
vention, to ascertain first the will of the people and pro-
cure from them a commission to call such a convention, 
before the Legislature proceeds to do so. The people 
being the repository of the right to alter or reform its 
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government, its will and wishes must be consulted be-
fore the Legislature can proceed to call a convention." 
[Italics ours] 
The several questions asked by the Governor lead to four 
considerations,— (1) the method of calling a convention, 
(2) the power and duties of a convention, (3) the manner 
of ratification and adoption of the constitutional form, and 
(4) the method of electing delegates. 
3. The Method of Calling a Convention. 
This question submitted is a very important one. No 
method of calling a convention is designated in the Consti-
tution. The prevailing doctrine today, as we shall show, is 
unquestionably that the question should be first submitted to 
the people by an act of the legislature, allowing them to 
vote whether in favor of or against such a convention. In 
the past there have been instances where the convention has 
been called by the legislature. I t is doubtful if that ever 
has been the prevailing view, and it certainly is not today. 
Both the opinions of the court and of the accepted writers 
sustain this view. The reasons for this view are easy to see. 
The refraining or revising of a constitution is a matter of 
great importance and far-reaching in its effect. I t affects 
the fundamental law of the state. I t of necessity requires 
deliberation, mature thought and careful consideration. 
The great danger is that one political party, swept into 
power by temporary issues, may hastily rush through a Con-
stitution and thereby solidify themselves in office. I t takes 
time to submit to the people the question of calling a conven-
tion. I t saves time if the legislature can by its own act elim-
inate this step and proceed directly to the election of dele-
gates. But delay is desirable, as it leads to deliberation, 
thought and study, which are of the essence of wise consti-
tution framing. 
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If the legislature passes upon this question of calling a 
convention, the electors are deprived of their opportunity to 
pass upon the question and aroused public opinion is unable 
to express its views as to the scope and purpose of the con-
vention. The voter will be called upon to designate dele-
gates and not to express his views upon the question of hold-
ing a convention or upon the scope of its works. If he votes 
for delegates, he votes for his representatives who may be 
limited in their deliberation by legislative act. If he refrains 
from voting, delegates will still be elected. Obviously such 
a convention when chosen is the creature of the legislature. 
Under this method there is no expression of the people's 
wishes. Their sovereign rights are ignored. 
I t is true that if the legislature submits the work of a 
convention to the people for their approval or rejection they 
may accept or reject it, but that is not a full exercise of the 
sovereign power of the people. I t is their right to initiate 
and direct the framing as well as to accept a Constitution. 
The delays caused by the submission of these questions to 
the people are highly desirable. The calling of a convention 
is not frequent and is little understood. Intelligent action 
on the part of the electorate requires time. One of the 
greatest evils is too much speed in the inception of the 
movement for a new Constitution. For these reasons the 
principle of the legislature submitting the question of call-
ing a constitutional convention to popular vote has become 
well established. 
These thoughts were concisely and ably stated by Judge 
Cooley in an article in the American Law Review (1889), 
page 311, when that eminent constitutional writer said: 
"A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of 
temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. 
I t is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield 
to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the 
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people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot 
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the 
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. 
* * * Changes in government are to be feared unless 
the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: 'All great 
mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not 
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and 
a worse. '" 
They have been well stated in State, ex rel. Wineman vs. 
Dahl, 6 N. D. 81-85 (1896), where the court says: 
"Nor can it be said that it is an empty form to leave 
to popular vote the grave question whether the people 
shall assemble in convention, and revise their funda-
mental law." 
and on page 87: 
"But while the power resides in the legislature, and 
that body only, to call a constitutional convention, it is 
obvious that the agents of the people, who have not been 
selected on that particular issue, should not take upon 
themselves the responsibility of burdening the people 
with the expense of such a movement, without first sub-
mitting to them the question whether they desire such a 
convention to be called. The argument against the 
taking of the initiative by the legislature in such cases, 
without first ascertaining public sentiment on the ques-
tion, is so strong, and lies so plainly on the surface, 
that in many states the Constitution, in terms, requires 
the submission of the proposition to popular vote, and 
a majority vote in its favor, before the legislature can 
legally summon the people to meet in convention to re-
vise their organic law." [Italics ours] 
In Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, 17, col. 1, 
2, (1912), the court says: 
" I t must be remembered that the Constitution is the 
people's enactment. No proposed change can become 
effective unless they will i t so through the compelling 
force of need of it and desire for it. We have not 
heard the voice of the people raised in a demand for a 
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new Constitution. And so we doubt if there is reason 
for applying the doctrine of construction ab incon-
venienti to the existing Constitution to hurry to the 
people organic change which they had not called for. 
That the Constitution may need an amendment may be 
true. But there has never been a time when the people 
might not, if they pleased and if they had believed it 
necessary, have made any change desired in the orderly 
ways provided. That they have not done so, and that 
the General Assembly may believe good will follow by 
deviating from slow and orderly processes, will not 
justify a construction of the Constitution which does 
violence to its intent and express provisions." 
Probably the weightiest opinion on this particular point 
is that of Chancellor Kent written in 1820. The New York 
State Assembly had undertaken to call a convention with-
out first submitting the question of the call to the people as 
a whole. The opinion in question was included in the state-
ment of objections made by the council of revision in return-
ing the bill to the Assembly. See Jameson pp. 669-671: 
"The council therefore think it the most wise and 
safe course, and most accordant with the performance 
of the great trust committed to the representative pow-
ers under the constitution, that the question of a gen-
eral revision of it should be submitted to the people 
in the first instance, to determine whether a convention 
ought to be convened. The declared sense of the Ameri-
can people throughout the United States on this very 
point cannot but be received with great respect and 
reverence; and it appears to be the almost universal 
will, expressed in their constitutional charters, that con-
ventions to alter the constitution shall not be called at 
the instance of the legislature without the previous 
sanction of the people, by whom these constitutions 
were ordained." 
An equally straightforward statement by the New York 
Supreme Court made in connection with the New York con-
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vention of 1894 is found in the Journals of the 69th New 
York Assembly, p. 919; approved by committee headed by 
Elihu Root in report to New York Convention of 1894, Rev. 
Record Vol. 1, p. 258-60-270: 
"The legislature is not supreme. It is only one of the 
instruments of that absolute sovereignty which resides 
in the whole body of the people. Like other depart-
ments of the government it acts under a delegation of 
powers; and cannot rightfully go beyond the limits 
which have been assigned to it. This delegation of 
powers has been made by a fundamental law, which no 
one department of the government nor all the depart-
ments united, have authority to change. That can only 
be done by the people themselves. A power has been 
given by the legislature to propose amendments to the 
Constitution, which, when approved and ratified by the 
people, becomes a part of the fundamental law. But no 
power has been delegated to the legislature to call a 
convention to revise the Constitution. That is a 
measure which must come from, and be the act of the 
people themselves." [Italics ours] 
A still more powerful statement of the principle involved 
was adopted at the Mississippi Convention of 1851 (See the 
Journals of that Convention, pp. 48-50, and the quotation 
therefrom in Hoar, p. 67) : 
"That in the opinion of this Convention, without in-
tending to call in question the motives of the members 
of the Legislature, by the call of this Convention, the 
Legislature, at its last extraordinary session, was un-
authorized by the people; and that said act, in peremp-
torily ordering a Convention of the people of the State, 
without first submitting to them the question whether 
there should be a Convention or no Convention, was an 
unwarranted assumption of power by the Legislature; 
at war with the spirit of republican institutions, an en-
croachment upon the rights of the people and can never 
be rightfully invoked as a precedent." [Italics ours] 
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Most constitutions expressly require action by the people. 
The correctness of the principle of requiring action by the 
people before a convention can be called is affirmed not only 
by the decisions and opinions cited above, but by the fact 
that it is expressly written into the text of thirty-two of our 
state Constitutions. 
Dodd in his work, Revision and Amendments of State 
Constitutions (1910), says at page 51: 
"The practice of obtaining the popular approval for 
a convention may be said to have become almost the 
set rule. Thirty-two constitutions require such an ex-
pression of approval and even where it has not been 
expressly required, such a popular vote has been taken 
in a majority of cases in recent years." 
Mr. Dodd then summarizes the situation and states at page 
53: 
"According to what is now the most usual procedure 
in the adoption of constitutions there are three popular 
votes connected with the mat ter : (1) The vote of the 
people authorizing the convention; (2) Selection by the 
people of delegates to the convention; (3) Submission 
to the people for their approval of a constitution framed 
by the convention." 
Mr. Hoar at page 60 reaffirms the statement of Mr. Dodd: 
"Thus the practice of obtaining the popular approval 
for the calling of a convention may be said to have be-
come almost the settled rule. Thirty-two State con-
stitutions require such a popular expression of ap-
proval, and even where it has not been expressly re-
quired, such a popular vote has been taken in a major-
ity of cases in recent years." 
See also Hoar, p. 68: 
"Thus convention calling is not a regular function of 
the legislature, and there is a growing tendency towards 
a view that the legislature has no power to call a con-
vention without first obtaining permission from the 
people." 
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The latest authority and in most respects the best is the 
case of Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N. E. 921, 923 
(1917). In that case an injunction was sought to prevent 
a convention which had been called by the legislature with-
out first submitting the question to the people. We again 
quote the language of the court, which is the last judicial 
utterance which we have been able to find which is in point: 
"The Legislature has no inherent rights. I ts powers 
are derived from the Constitution, and hence, where 
some action of the legislative body, which action is 
outside of the particular field fixed by the Constitution 
and is not strictly legislative within the meaning of 
section 1, art. 4. supra, is sought to be justified, a war-
rant for the same must be found somewhere; if not in 
the Constitution, then directly from the people, who, 
by the terms of section 1, art. 1, of the Bill of Rights, 
have retained the right to amend or change their form 
of government. The right of the people in this regard 
is supreme, subject, however, to the condition that no 
new form of a Constitution can be established on the 
ruins of the old without some action on the part of the 
representatives of the old. indicating their acquiescence 
therein; and, the General Assembly being the closest 
representative of the old, its approval must be obtained 
by some affirmative act. This is the only orderly way 
that could be conceived. The question then arises: 
How may these, the people and the Legislature, get to-
gether on this proposition? If no positive rule is pro-
vided by the fundamental law of the state, then, if a 
custom has prevailed for a sufficient length of years so 
that it is said to be fully established, that rule or cus-
tom must prevail. 
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all of 
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself 
does not provide for the calling of a constitutional con-
vention, to ascertain first the will of the people and 
procure from them a commission to call such a conven-
tion, before the Legislature proceeds to do so. The peo-
308 
pie being the repository of the right to alter or reform 
its government, its will and wishes must be consulted 
before the Legislature can proceed to call a convention. 
6 R. C. L. §17, p. 27; Hoar, Constitution Conventions, 
p. 68 (1917)." 
* * * * 
"I t is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judg-
ment of the lower court denying injunction be reversed, 
with directions to restate its first, third, fourth, and 
fifth conclusions of law in conformity with this 
opinion." 
The dissenting opinion by Lairy, J., was based on other 
grounds. 
This is probably the latest authority that we have upon 
this subject and is a well-considered case. The legislature 
cannot create the convention or bring it into being without 
a mandate from the people. I t is not within the legislature's 
power. Hoar reasons thus, at p. 65: 
"A still fur ther consideration is as follows: If it be 
the legislature which enacts the convention act and thus 
calls the convention into being, then the legislature can 
confer on another body (i. e., the convention) a power 
(i. e., to propose a constitution) which the legislature 
itself does not possess; which is absurd." 
4. The Danger in Calling a Convention without a Referen-
dum to the People. 
If this first important step is eliminated, the American 
system of reforming the constitution is deprived of one of its 
most important elements in securing the enlightenment and 
education of the people to perform their necessary part in 
the adoption of the constitution. Why should it be elimin-
ated? Why the haste? The old government still exists and 
functions. There is no demand heard on the par t of the peo-
ple that there should be a new form of government. If it is 
done for mere political reasons, if it is done for a mere de-
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sire to perpetuate the reign of those in power, such motives 
while inspiring haste furnish the strongest of arguments 
why exceptional and unlawful methods should not be re-
sorted to. 
Jameson (Const. Con v. §122, p. 110) states the danger 
of omitting to submit the question of calling a constitutional 
convention to the people, and holds that "public opinion 
should have settled upon its necessity." He says: 
"A simple resolution or vote [ of the legislature] 
would commonly give expression to the general desire, 
but were that all, there would be danger that party 
spirit might avail itself of majority to call conventions 
for partisan purposes. This danger being far from un-
real, doubtless the wiser course would be for the legis-
lature so to act as to forestall it. A check ought to be 
found by which the probability of its occurrence would 
be reduced to a minimum." [Italics ours] 
The author then refers to the expedient adopted in many 
states, of submitting the question to the people for their ap-
proval or rejection. He refers with full approval to the 
language of Chancellor Kent in the report of N. Y. Council 
of Revision, where this practice was much commended, 
(1821 App. F. 669-71, for full copy) and proceeds (p. I l l , 
referring to the report of this Council upon the principle of 
first submitting the question of calling a convention to the 
people) : 
" * * * , by whom it was declared to be most conso-
nant to the principles of our government and of the 
practice of other states. * * * * There can be no doubt 
that this decision was a sound one on constitutional 
principles. The intervention of the legislature is neces-
sary to give a legal starting point to a convention, and 
to hedge it about by such restraints as shall ensure 
obedience to the law; but as a convention ought to be 
called only when demanded by the public necessities, 
and then to be as nearly as possible the act of the sov-
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ereign body itself, it would seem proper to leave the 
matter to the decision of the electoral body, which 
stands nearest to the sovereignty, and best represents 
its opinion. Such seems to be the prevailing sentiment 
in most of the states. * * * " [Italics ours] 
Jameson further refers to the danger of hasty action and 
says: 
§532. "I t is obvious that, were the existing govern-
ment of a state, or any branch of it, invested with the 
power, without condition or limit, to call conventions 
to change the organic law, there would be cause to 
apprehend two dangers; • * * * that our conventions 
would become the arenas, and our constitutions the ob-
jects as well as the instruments of party conflict. The 
right of the people at any time to amend their constitu-
tions must be admitted; but as they can never do this 
directly, the necessity becomes apparent of checks, to 
render it probable that a movement to that end has 
been sanctioned by them, and that it has been done upon 
due consideration. * * * , the checks must be such as 
will obviate the evils' above enumerated, resulting from 
haste, excess, and partisan zeal, in legislation." [Italics 
ours] 
The author then advocates the submission of the question 
of holding a constitutional convention to a vote of the peo-
ple, saying, 
"and, therefore, whenever the electors have assented to 
the call of a convention, its necessity or eminent propri-
ety may be considered to be beyond doubt." 
James Madison also appreciated the dangers of hasty 
action in the alteration and changing of constitutions, 
(Madison's Works, Vol. 1, p. 177). 
Jameson uses appropriate, if strong, language when he 
describes the all too prevalent conditions which surround the 
calling of constitutional conventions. They are very true to-
day in all parts of this country. This state could hardly 
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be called an exception. The danger is that the convention 
will be called for partisan purposes; that it will become an 
"arena" and the objects of the convention become the "in-
struments of party conflict." Our courts and writers have 
been well aware of this situation, and have endeavored to 
lessen the evils by removing the conventions as far as pos-
sible "from haste, excess and partisan zeal" as a result of 
legislation. 
The court cannot be unaware that the tide of party pas-
sion is running high in this state at the present time. Words 
are spoken and action is contemplated, if not actually under-
taken, which would not be thought of in normal times. 
Therefore, the exercise of those safeguards which constitu-
tional law has so carefully and wisely provided, should in a 
time like this, as in all other times, be applied to the present 
situation. Chief among these safeguards is the one which 
we have just considered with such care and at such length. 
5. Rhode Island Precedents. 
The only precedents which have arisen under the Rhode 
Island Constitution are in full accord with the foregoing 
authorities. After Rhode Island had adopted its Constitu-
tion of 1842, the question of holding a constitutional conven-
tion in Rhode Island was submitted to the people twice in 
1853. Rhode Island then had a Constitution and a General 
Assembly elected under that Constitution. When seeking a 
constitutional convention the General Assembly did not at-
tempt to call a convention itself, but sought the express 
approval of the electors. 
At the May Session 1853 of the General Assembly (Acts 
and Resolves. May Session 1853) an act was passed by which 
"The people of this State # * # are # * # invited 
and requested to give in their ballots upon the question 
of holding a Convention. And if it shall appear that a 
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majority * * * are in favor of said Convention, it shall 
be deemed and taken to be the will of the people of this 
State, that a Convention shall meet * * * 
And the people were further requested to elect delegates to 
such Convention in the event that it should be approved by 
the electors. A majority of the votes were against the hold-
ing of a convention, but delegates were elected. 
Again at the October Session 1853 of the General Assem-
bly (Acts and Resolves, October Session 1853) an act was 
passed in similar language to that of the May Session invit-
ing and requesting the people to vote upon the question of a 
convention. 
The two acts are important. 
(1) They show full recognition of the right of the people 
of this state, and not the General Assembly, to pass upon the 
question of calling a convention. This was in full conform-
ity with the well-established practice of that time. 
(2) The General Assembly acted as the voluntary agent 
of the people. Notice the humble and deferential language 
when it "invited and requested" the "people" to give in their 
ballots. There is no command, no threat of punishment if 
action is not taken. The Assembly declares that if a major-
ity votes favorably "it will be deemed and taken to be the 
toill of the people of this State" that a convention be held. 
Not the decree or edict of the Assembly but the will of the 
"people" must determine. All this is recognized by the 
Assembly, and it speaks as the agent, the servant, and to the 
people, its master. 
These two acts are drawn in the most correct and ap-
proved manner. 
All undertakings to revise or amend the charter after 1853 
were in accordance with Article X I I I of the Constitution. 
The use of earlier instances in which constitutional con-
ventions were called and the General Assembly did not sub-
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mit the question of holding a convention to a vote of the 
people as an argument that the legislature may itself call a 
convention is not "warranted. Conventions were called in 
this state by the General Assembly in 1824, 1834, 1841 and 
1842. But at that time the state was acting under its old 
charter granted by Charles II . These charters placed al-
most controlling authority in the General Assembly in the 
government of the colony. The judiciary and other branches 
of the government were treated as subordinate to it. Consti-
tutional government did not exist at those times as we now 
understand that branch of our law. Therefore, the calling 
of the conventions under the charter can not fairly be cited 
as arguments in favor of the power or practice of legisla-
tures themselves to call constitutional conventions without 
first submitting the question to the people. 
In support of this view we will refer to the comments of 
Mr. Dodd (at p. 37) written when discussing the adoption of 
a Constitution by Vermont in 1786. He says: 
"A Vermont author [Thomas Crittenden] has well 
expressed what were at that time popular views in this 
state as to the relation between the constitution and the 
legislature: ' In all governments which had previously 
existed, the legislature, the law-making power, had been 
sovereign, absolute and uncontrollable.' Judge Black-
stone says: leg is la t ion is the greatest act of superiori-
ty that can be exercised by one being over another, 
wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of law, that 
it be made by the supreme power. Sovereignty and 
legislation are, indeed, convertible terms. One cannot 
subsist without the other.' This constitutional law, this 
omnipotence of the legislature, the colonists brought 
with them from the mother country, as they brought 
with them the common law." 
This idea that the legislature was supreme, which was 
brought to this country from England together with the 
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English common law, and which placed the judiciary and 
executive departments below the legislative department, was 
the English law. So long as we were acting under the char-
ter, until 1842, it was the law in this state. The theory of 
the superiority of the legislature to the judiciary was not 
exploded until the case of Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. Dodd 
says that it continued until a late date in Pennsylvania and 
Vermont. 
However, it should be noted that in the acts of 1824, 1834, 
1841 and 1842 the General Assembly went no further than to 
provide that the freemen or people "are hereby requested to 
choose" delegates to a convention for the purpose of fram-
ing a new constitution. Such an act is clearly not legisla-
tion; the people may observe or disregard the same at 
pleasure; and it amounts to no more than utilizing the exist-
ing machinery of government for the purpose of giving the 
people an opportunity to act in an orderly and reasonable 
manner to bring about changes, when no other manner is 
prescribed. 
Accordingly, we submit that precedents both before and 
after 1842 are in accord with the argument heretofore ad-
vanced ; to wit, that even if the General Assembly can call a 
constitutional convention, it must first receive authority to 
do so by a referendum to the people. 
III. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IS 
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO 
POWER TO PROVIDE THAT THE GENERAL OF-
FICERS OF THE STATE SHALL BY VIRTUE OF 
THEIR OFFICES BE MEMBERS OF SUCH CON-
VENTION. 
This question, it is clear in our opinion, should be an-
swered in the negative. The thought behind subdivision (c) 
of the Governor's question evidently is that the General As-
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sembly might by act or resolution make the Governor, Lieu-
tenant Governor, Secretary of State, General Treasurer and 
Attorney General ex-officio members of the convention, with 
the same powers as other delegates. 
This proposal is absolutely foreign to the whole theory of 
constitution making as emanating from the people. I t sug-
gests a usurpation of power by the General Assembly for 
which no authority worthy of consideration can be found 
either in practice or in theory. I t may be that in the confu-
sion which attended the setting up of new constitutions im-
mediately af ter the Revolution, a few instances may be found 
where the legislature went so far as to designate delegates 
to a constitutional convention. Such instances are not sur-
prising, considering the pressure of the times. Men could 
not in the midst of a revolution halt to consider all the pre-
cedents. In emergencies they resorted to emergency meas-
ures. Moreover, the colonial legislatures, operating under 
charters from the Crown, had exercised much broader pow-
ers than they possess under American theories of constitu-
tional law. 
The only court opinion which we have found in which such 
action was even referred to is that of Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. 
St. 39, where, though the legality of such action was in no 
way involved, the court in its passing remarks throws grave 
doubt upon the wisdom of the legislature selecting any of 
the members of the convention. Aside from the Revolution-
ary examples, and with the possible exception of Wells vs. 
Bain, it seems never to have occurred to anyone that it was 
not a necessary element of every constitutional convention 
that the delegates thereto be elected by the people them-
selves. I t is difficult to argue otherwise. The convention 
should be so constituted as to obtain the greatest freedom 
from partisan bias and control and the maximum capacity 
for deliberate, dispassionate, unbiased action to be applied 
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to the important duty of making a constitution. The mem-
bers thereof should be the choice of the whole people and 
not of a partisan body such as the legislature. 
Beyond those functions assumed by it under the necessity 
of the occasion in respect to those acts which the people can-
not perform themselves, the legislature may act, but in no 
other respect. But in so acting, the legislature is not exercis-
ing legislative power under the constitution. Furthermore, 
there is no necessity for the legislature to elect all or any of 
the delegates as the voluntary agent of the people. All the 
delegates can easily be elected by the people. 
I t seems clear that that department of government—the 
executive department—which is most likely to be affected by 
the action of the convention as to its powers, election of its 
officers, and in other respects, should not have its active rep-
resentatives ex-officio or otherwise as members of that im-
portant body. If they wish to impress their views upon the 
convention they should appear before the convention, not 
in it. 
These five general officers should not be made members 
of the convention by legislative act any more than high mem-
bers of the judiciary or the members of the legislative 
branch. If it can be done in one instance it can be done with 
equal propriety in the other,—and so on, without limit. The 
views of all of these three departments of the state, each of 
which may be so vitally affected by the action of the conven-
tion, can be effectively presented to the convention by their 
representatives appearing before the convention without be-
ing represented by membership within it. 
If the General Assembly can pass an act that the five gen-
eral officers shall be members of the convention, it can pass 
an act that the entire membership of the legislature shall be 
members of the convention or perhaps the only members. 
If it can designate five members it can designate half or 
three-quarters or all of the members. Even the entire Gen-
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eral Assembly could be made a part of the convention. There 
is no stopping place once the power is conceded. Considera-
tion of these possibilities goes far to show the unsoundness 
of the proposition submitted. 
There is no inherent power in the legislature to take such 
action, nor is there any occasion for the existence or exer-
cise of such power. The lack of precedent goes far to show 
this. If it can declare these five general officers members of 
the convention, by virtue of their office, i t can so constitute 
the convention that these five would control the work of the 
convention. For example, it could so enact as to give an 
equal number of delegates to its own major party and an 
equal number to the opposite party but add thereto the five 
general officers of the state, ex-officio, as suggested by the 
governor's question. Or again, suppose those same general 
officers happened to be of the opposite party, would the leg-
islature then feel that it had the power to elect or designate 
the holders of these same general offices as members of the 
convention? Of course not. Again, each department of the 
government is to be affected by the new constitution in its 
powers, rights and privileges, and consequently its officials 
are highly interested parties in the results of that conven-
tion. They are not disinterested and should not be members 
and. it is submitted, the General Assembly in the exercise 
of its legislative power or in the exercise of any assumed role 
of agent of the people has no power to make them members. 
IV. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IS 
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO 
POWER TO CONTROL THE ACTION OR WORK 
OF SUCH CONVENTION. 
Cooley (p. 87), I I I : 
" * # * But no body of representatives, unless espe-
cially clothed with power for that purpose by the people 
